Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0755zbMath1032.91033OpenAlexW2043684662MaRDI QIDQ1581906

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 11 March 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0755

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofmechanismexcludability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (7)

Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units ⋮ The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. ⋮ On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry

Cites Work

• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

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