The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0757zbMath0977.91004OpenAlexW2047033344MaRDI QIDQ1581908

José M. Zarzuela, Gooni Orshan

Publication date: 10 October 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0757

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionNTU gamesbilateral consistent prekernel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core ⋮ Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores ⋮ The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games

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