Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0753zbMath0956.91025OpenAlexW3124453114MaRDI QIDQ1581909

Rajiv Sethi

Publication date: 10 October 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0753

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityevolutionary game dynamicsstable equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (15)

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Can you guess the game you are playing? ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game

Cites Work

• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
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