Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence

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Publication:1581910

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0754zbMath0956.91013OpenAlexW2082426369MaRDI QIDQ1581910

Dale O. II Stahl

Publication date: 10 October 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/130664d4d865f65fd52d9afd03e5e15ae36763eb



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