A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00210-6zbMath0967.90008MaRDI QIDQ1582036

Wei Shi Lim

Publication date: 3 September 2001

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycostqualityrevelation principlecontract designloggistics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (7)

Optimal payment scheme when the supplier's quality level and cost are unknown ⋮ Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory ⋮ Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ How to increase the impact of disaster relief: a study of transportation rates, framework agreements and product distribution ⋮ A game-theoretic approach to the freight transportation pricing problem in the presence of intermodal service providers in a competitive market ⋮ Pricing and ordering decisions in a retailer dominant channel involving a third-party logistics provider ⋮ Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor

Cites Work

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• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Role of Inventory in Delivery-Time Competition
• Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Competing in Product and Service: A Product Life-Cycle Model

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