A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0zbMath1145.91305WikidataQ126839110 ScholiaQ126839110MaRDI QIDQ1583176

R. Smith

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

price leadershipdominant firmBertrand-Edgeworth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (2)

On Forchheimer's model of dominant firm price leadership ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Cites Work

• Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Games with Discontinuous Payoffs
• Price Leadership
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big

This page was built for publication: A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe.