Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00301-3zbMath0984.91031OpenAlexW2084205975MaRDI QIDQ1583272

Roland Strausz, Helmut Bester

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00301-3

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmechanism designrevelation principlelimited commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation ⋮ The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers ⋮ Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Symmetric mechanism design ⋮ On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure ⋮ Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case ⋮ General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

Cites Work

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

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