The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00312-8zbMath0956.91064OpenAlexW2129128990WikidataQ56212384 ScholiaQ56212384MaRDI QIDQ1583405

Jean-Pierre Benoît

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00312-8

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

Related Items (9)

Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ⋮ Circular domains ⋮ Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems ⋮ Sen's proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems ⋮ Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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