Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2648zbMath1103.91340OpenAlexW2001848964MaRDI QIDQ1584555

Uday Rajan, Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2648

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting

Cites Work

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