Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
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Publication:1584679
DOI10.1007/PL00004080zbMath0963.91022MaRDI QIDQ1584679
Yongsheng Xu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Walter Bossert
Publication date: 27 June 2001
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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