A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00286-6zbMath1055.91513OpenAlexW1971683489MaRDI QIDQ1584824

Rudolf Vetschera

Publication date: 2000

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00286-6

zbMATH Keywords

Decision theoryOrganizationPrincipal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (3)

Unifying temporal and organizational scales in multiscale decision-making ⋮ Learning about preferences in electronic negotiations - A volume-based measurement method ⋮ Multiscale decision-making: bridging organizational scales in systems with distributed decision-makers

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