Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
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Publication:1584962
DOI10.1007/s002850000042zbMath0984.91015MaRDI QIDQ1584962
Peter E. Trapa, Martin A. Nowak
Publication date: 14 May 2002
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
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