Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00008-7zbMath0962.91003OpenAlexW2082651375MaRDI QIDQ1587389

Matthias Blonski

Publication date: 5 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00008-7

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy equilibriafinite anonymous games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (14)

On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria ⋮ Reasoning in large games with unboundedly many players ⋮ Weighted Boolean Formula Games ⋮ Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games ⋮ On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria ⋮ Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games ⋮ Symmetry in \(n\)-player games ⋮ DYNAMICS OF CHOICE RESTRICTION IN LARGE GAMES ⋮ Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders ⋮ The women of Cairo: equilibria in large anonymous games ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ Subgames within large games and the heuristic of imitation ⋮ Ordinally symmetric games ⋮ Dynamic Restriction of Choices: Synthesis of Societal Rules

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Anonymous games with binary actions
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information

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