Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies
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Publication:1587390
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00040-9zbMath0966.91018MaRDI QIDQ1587390
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
evolutionary dynamicsoligopoly gamesglobally surviving strategyprice strategyprice-setting oligopolyquantity strategyquantity-setting oligopolystochastically stable statestochastically stable statessymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods
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