Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
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Publication:1589621
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00332-3zbMath0963.91019OpenAlexW2100550434WikidataQ56212383 ScholiaQ56212383MaRDI QIDQ1589621
Publication date: 12 December 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00332-3
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Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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