Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00047-5zbMath1032.91088OpenAlexW2157039796WikidataQ126353217 ScholiaQ126353217MaRDI QIDQ1590140

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 11 March 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00047-5

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriummarketcoalitionLindahl equilibriumWalrasian allocationlinear cost share equilibriumNash allocationRatio equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
• An implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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