Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
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Publication:1590682
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0761zbMath0971.91008OpenAlexW2093185446MaRDI QIDQ1590682
Publication date: 26 September 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0761
Related Items (4)
Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection ⋮ Learning in Games ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
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