Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
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Publication:1590683
DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0767zbMath1028.91003OpenAlexW1996864214MaRDI QIDQ1590683
Publication date: 21 December 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0767
Related Items (4)
A two-player iterated survival game ⋮ An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION
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