Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0767zbMath1028.91003OpenAlexW1996864214MaRDI QIDQ1590683

Ross Cressman

Publication date: 21 December 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0767

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsextensive form gamessubgame monotone

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

A two-player iterated survival game ⋮ An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION

Cites Work

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• An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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