Focal points in framed strategic forms

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0771zbMath1006.91004OpenAlexW1971678877MaRDI QIDQ1590689

André Casajus

Publication date: 12 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0771

zbMATH Keywords

isomorphismssymmetriesfocal pointsframingsalience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (7)

We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory ⋮ Symmetric play in repeated allocation games ⋮ Symmetric games revisited ⋮ Minority voting and long-term decisions ⋮ The evolution of focal points ⋮ Variable-frame level-\(n\) theory ⋮ Circulant games

Cites Work

• Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
• The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
• Variable-frame level-\(n\) theory
• Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
• Non-cooperative games
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Focal points in framed strategic forms