Optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1999.1113zbMath0966.91054OpenAlexW2162980599WikidataQ114695448 ScholiaQ114695448MaRDI QIDQ1590751

Emilson C. D. Silva, Yoko Nagase

Publication date: 21 December 2000

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1999.1113

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumenvironmental policiesdecentralized informationdecentralized leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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