Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1592721
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0776zbMath1028.91523OpenAlexW2050914502WikidataQ123097456 ScholiaQ123097456MaRDI QIDQ1592721
Publication date: 29 March 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0776
Related Items
COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS, Gender, emotions, and tournament performance in the laboratory, The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games, A random shock is not random assignment, Promises and endogenous reneging costs, Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach, Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games, The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games, Communication and visibility in public goods provision, What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence, The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games, Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude, Coordination via delay: theory and experiment, How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?, Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task, Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium., The framing of games and the psychology of play, Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups, Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection, Editorial. New directions in behavioral game theory: introduction to the special issue, When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory, Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives, Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination, A note on pre-play communication, Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk, Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction, Bare promises: an experiment, ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games, From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence, Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination, Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions, Intention or request: the impact of message structures, The intraday liquidity management game, Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence, Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information, Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
- A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
