Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0782zbMath1006.91038OpenAlexW2030385061MaRDI QIDQ1592722

Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e1b4b6d1fa35a6468211f93dd62ed4d13253466b

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiescontractinvestmentshold-up problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.

Cites Work

• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information

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