Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0777zbMath1047.91045OpenAlexW2127763530MaRDI QIDQ1592728

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0fd697cd53b896017c06ada99da7cfc658a14eef

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumPareto allocationincentive-compatible mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. ⋮ Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons ⋮ The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization

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