Coordination and learning with a partial language

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2674zbMath0972.91082OpenAlexW2054175961MaRDI QIDQ1592822

Andreas Blume

Publication date: 13 May 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52600

zbMATH Keywords

languagecoordinationcommon knowledgeoptimal learningcommon knownledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Linguistics (91F20) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Related Items

Decentralized learning from failure ⋮ The measurement of the value of a language ⋮ Coordination via correlation: an experimental study ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Fragile meaning -- an experiment ⋮ Symmetric play in repeated allocation games ⋮ An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games ⋮ Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining ⋮ The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes ⋮ Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study ⋮ Compromise and coordination: an experimental study ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs ⋮ A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language

Uses Software

• GAP

Cites Work

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