Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1592827
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2680zbMath0983.91034OpenAlexW2151822041MaRDI QIDQ1592827
Publication date: 23 April 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8461cad0589e0363aefed1289dfc9b8abf504ee4
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (4)
Walrasian bargaining. ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ Competitive bargaining equilibrium ⋮ Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Agreeing to disagree
- Arbitrage and the flattening effect of large numbers
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
- Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Fair Net Trades
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
This page was built for publication: Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
