A model of stability and persistence in a democracy

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0759zbMath1028.91504OpenAlexW1987350350MaRDI QIDQ1593743

Hans Peter Grüner, Angelo Artale

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0759

zbMATH Keywords

democracypolitical persistencepolitical stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Inequality and political consensus

Cites Work

• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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