An experiment on the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signalling in bargaining

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0762zbMath0962.91029OpenAlexW1973756718MaRDI QIDQ1593748

Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0762

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining experimentface-to-face interactiontruth-signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Cites Work

• Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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