Privately observed time horizons in repeated games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0766zbMath1028.91008OpenAlexW2000093055MaRDI QIDQ1593749

Régis Renault

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0766

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumBayesian equilibriumrepeated finite game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Perturbed finitely repeated games

Cites Work

• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known
• Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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