In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0774zbMath1006.91001OpenAlexW2005821458MaRDI QIDQ1593751

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0774

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardstrategic delegationdelegation equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking ⋮ Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit ⋮ The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information ⋮ Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players ⋮ Sharing the effort costs in group contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
• Contest success functions
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation

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