Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers

DOI10.1023/A:1009989907258zbMath0973.91502MaRDI QIDQ1595287

Todd L. Cherry, John A. List

Publication date: 26 November 2001

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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