Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
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Publication:1595288
DOI10.1023/A:1009942024096zbMath0973.91524MaRDI QIDQ1595288
Publication date: 26 November 2001
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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