Attainable results in committee elections.

DOI10.1016/S0895-7177(99)00117-XzbMath1043.91506OpenAlexW1987663360MaRDI QIDQ1596956

Hans-Hermann Bock, William H. E. Day, Grzegorz M. Kubicki, Ewa M. Kubicka, Fred R. McMorris

Publication date: 5 May 2002

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(99)00117-x

zbMATH Keywords

CharacterizationAttainable resultCommittee electionConsensus ruleVoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. ⋮ A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
• The nature and measurement of freedom
• The human brain, social conformity, and presidential elections
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications

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