Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model

DOI10.1023/A:1021062232074zbMath1012.91503WikidataQ57152197 ScholiaQ57152197MaRDI QIDQ1598438

Richard S. J. Tol

Publication date: 11 June 2003

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (4)

Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries ⋮ The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy ⋮ International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

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