Introduction to political science
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Publication:1599822
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2879zbMath1037.91603OpenAlexW2001485981MaRDI QIDQ1599822
Aldo Rustichini, Jeffrey S. Banks, David Austen-Smith
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2879
Cites Work
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Large Poisson games
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Distributive politics and electoral competition
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
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