Distributive politics and electoral competition
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Publication:1599829
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2775zbMath1031.91024OpenAlexW2091647285WikidataQ60680561 ScholiaQ60680561MaRDI QIDQ1599829
Nathalie Picard, Jean-François Laslier
Publication date: 27 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2775
Related Items (28)
Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Voting over income taxation ⋮ \(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values ⋮ Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections ⋮ Proportional resource allocation in dynamic \(n\)-player Blotto games ⋮ From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations ⋮ Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications ⋮ An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of resource allocation in the Colonel Blotto game ⋮ The lottery Blotto game ⋮ Hierarchical models of warfare ⋮ Contests with limited resources ⋮ All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities ⋮ A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set ⋮ The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game ⋮ Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria ⋮ The Colonel Blotto game ⋮ Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation ⋮ Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case ⋮ The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game ⋮ A class of \(N\)-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information ⋮ In Silico Voting Experiments ⋮ The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems ⋮ Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack ⋮ A Blotto game with incomplete information ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-contestant generalized lottery Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Introduction to political science
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- Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics
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