Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2862zbMath1031.91023OpenAlexW2032912904MaRDI QIDQ1599833

Michel Le Breton, Matthew O. Jackson, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 27 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b491053b0511785747b83ccd74337d20a8af8d4f

zbMATH Keywords

votingsuccessive eliminationcandidacy gamestrategic candidacytree and binary voting procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ A theory of iterative choice in lists ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model ⋮ A foundation for strategic agenda voting ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency ⋮ Introduction to political science

Cites Work

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• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
• Choice and Revealed Preference
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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