When imperfect collution is profitable

DOI10.1007/BF01224738zbMath1010.91509MaRDI QIDQ1601329

Andrea Lofaro

Publication date: 26 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cartel stabilityimperfect collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (2)

Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry ⋮ A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Stable Cartels

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