Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2809zbMath1010.91011OpenAlexW2047968224MaRDI QIDQ1601451

R. Smith

Publication date: 26 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3aee129a5db7f510186b2e4e1e99cf36fc5533a9

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbounded rationalityMarkov equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority games ⋮ Repeated games with one-memory ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality

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