Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
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Publication:1601458
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2788zbMath1010.91063OpenAlexW2126587558MaRDI QIDQ1601458
Publication date: 20 May 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/479b0bd4661fa881b772b46ef156a0a1a715ab1e
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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