The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1167zbMath1139.90348OpenAlexW1964947023MaRDI QIDQ1601492

Laurent Franckx

Publication date: 26 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5a907fc065898b42a205e0958b13c7696d08295a

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentambient inspectionsenvironmental enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets ⋮ The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

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