A hybrid equilibrium in segmented markets: The three-firm case

DOI10.1007/BF01231490zbMath0992.91033OpenAlexW2141315565MaRDI QIDQ1601961

Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas

Publication date: 22 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01231490

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategysegmented marketsloyal consumers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
• Mixed pricing in oligopoly
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
• Equilibrium Comparison Shopping
• Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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