Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor

DOI10.1007/BF01232417zbMath0992.91057OpenAlexW2156543501MaRDI QIDQ1601964

Pierre Dehez, David de la Croix, Eric Toulemonde

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01232417

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingunionemploymentefficient contractmonopolist firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Employment Determination in British Industry: Investigations Using Micro- Data
• Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry

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