Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

DOI10.1007/BF01232420zbMath1010.91016MaRDI QIDQ1601967

Luca Lambertini, Dan Sasaki

Publication date: 6 October 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationsecurity levelpenal codespositivity constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes ⋮ The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames ⋮ Generalizing Pure and Impure Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas to the Case of Infinite and Infinitesimal Quantities ⋮ Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach ⋮ Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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