Two destabilizing strategies may be jointly stabilizing

DOI10.1007/BF01231208zbMath0992.91019MaRDI QIDQ1601968

Reiner Franke, Tim Nesemann

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycobweb modelbehavioral heterogeneityforecast procedureslearning dynamics with heterogeneous agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (6)

Cognitive ability and earnings performance: evidence from double auction market experiments ⋮ Smart or stupid depends on who is your counterpart: a cobweb model with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Stability, chaos and multiple attractors: a single agent makes a difference ⋮ Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena: does heterogeneity matter? ⋮ STABILITY AND CYCLES IN A COBWEB MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS ⋮ Dynamics of beliefs and learning under \(a_{L}\)-processes -- the heterogeneous case

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• Least squares learning with heterogeneous expectations
• A Rational Route to Randomness
• Local Convergence of Recursive Learning to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models

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