Shareholders' choice

DOI10.1007/BF01237187zbMath0992.91025OpenAlexW4250491659MaRDI QIDQ1601985

Hans H. Haller, Petra M. W. A. Geraats

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237187

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic resultsshareholder votingmedian-voter approachproduction decisionsshareholder disagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Asymptotic shareholder unanimity with exogenous noise
• Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity
• The foundation of the theory of monopolistic competition revisited
• The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
• On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies
• Corporate Production and Shareholder Cooperation under Uncertainty
• Competitive Stock Markets
• Expected utility maximization and capital budgeting subgoals
• Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting

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