Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

DOI10.1007/s100580100055zbMath1005.91039OpenAlexW4230117168MaRDI QIDQ1601994

Steven R. Williams

Publication date: 25 February 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/1430

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumtwo-step procedurerestricted preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation

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