Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

DOI10.1007/S100580100036zbMath1008.91064OpenAlexW2074376486MaRDI QIDQ1602001

Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 4 September 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100036

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityoptimalitymanipulabilitypermit sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem ⋮ Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds ⋮ The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem

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