First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge

DOI10.1007/s100580100039zbMath1005.91055OpenAlexW3125006072MaRDI QIDQ1602002

Shmuel Zamir, Michael Landsberger, Jacob Rubinstein, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100039

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge ⋮ Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Private versus complete information in auctions ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Signal jamming in a sequential auction ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

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