Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00079-9zbMath1050.91015OpenAlexW2015563421MaRDI QIDQ1602939

Pradeep Dubey, Chien-wei Wu

Publication date: 24 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9

zbMATH Keywords

competitive pricecompetitive contractproductive agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (5)

Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes ⋮ Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests ⋮ Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments. ⋮ Information manipulation and competition ⋮ Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

Cites Work

• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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