The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs

DOI10.1016/S0167-6377(01)00096-7zbMath0993.90027OpenAlexW2027210868MaRDI QIDQ1604051

Moshe Haviv

Publication date: 3 July 2002

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(01)00096-7

zbMATH Keywords

congestionpricingexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of queueing theory (congestion, allocation, storage, traffic, etc.) (60K30)

Related Items (10)

Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case ⋮ Applied cost allocation: the DEA-Aumann-Shapley approach ⋮ An optimal congestion and cost-sharing pricing scheme for multiclass services ⋮ Cooperative networks games with elastic demands ⋮ The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late ⋮ Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services ⋮ A fair staff allocation rule for the capacity pooling of multiple call centers ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ A survey on networking games in telecommunications ⋮ On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing

Cites Work

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• An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems
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• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Optimal Incentive-Compatible Priority Pricing for the M/M/1 Queue
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

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